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Requiring Disclosure of the Origin of Genetic
Resources and Prior Informed Consent in Patent
Applications Without Infringing The TRIPS
Agreement: The Problem and The Solution
Nuno Pires de Carvalho*
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Article is to discuss how the requirement that
the origin of genetic resources and prior informed consent be
disclosed in patent applications (hereinafter “Requirement”) can be
adopted by World Trade Organization (WTO) Members at the
national, regional, or international levels without infringing the
TRIPS Agreement.1 This discussion arises in three different contexts.
The first context is the implementation of the Convention on
Biological Diversity by biodiversity-rich countries.2 In doing so,
these countries are seeking ways that enable article 15 of the
Convention, and in particular its paragraphs 5 and 7,3 to acquire a
* J.D., LL.M., S.J.D., Federal University of Minas Gerais, Brazil; LL.M., J.S.D.,
Washington University in St. Louis, MO, USA. The author served in the Division of
Intellectual Property of the World Trade Organization (WTO) between 1996 and 1999 and
currently serves in the Global Intellectual Property Issues Division of the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) in Geneva, Switzerland. All views expressed are the author’s
and not necessarily those of the organizations with which he was or is affiliated.
1. Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS
Agreement), Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, which concluded on Apr. 15, 1994, effective on Jan. 1, 1995.
2. Convention on Biological Diversity [hereinafter CBD], opened for signature on June
5, 1992, at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the Rio “Earth
Summit”). It became effective on Dec. 29, 1993.
3. CBD, supra note 2, art. 15.5, 15.7 (“Access to genetic resources shall be subject to
prior informed consent of the Contracting Party providing such resources, unless otherwise
determined by that Party.”). CBD, article 15.7 states:
Each Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy measures, as
appropriate, and in accordance with Articles 16 and 19 . . . with the aim of sharing in a
fair and equitable way the results of research and development and the benefits arising
from the commercial and other utilization of genetic resources with the Contracting
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practical meaning. Some countries believe one possible way is to
identify, through patent specifications, the commercial applications
of inventions derived, directly or indirectly, from genetic resources
extracted from their biodiversity. Ultimately, what is at stake is the
possibility of detecting commercial gains from the use of genetic
resources, so that countries supplying those resources can demand
their share in the benefits. The second context is the review of article
27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement4 by the Council for TRIPS and the
now suspended new round of multilateral negotiations in the WTO,
which failed to begin in Seattle. In this context, a number of
developing countries proposed to modify article 29 of the TRIPS
Agreement, which establishes conditions on patent applicants.
Finally, in the course of the discussions leading to the adoption of the
Patent Law Treaty (PLT), under the auspices of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Colombia proposed the
inclusion of the Requirement in the Treaty.
This Article will show that the compatibility of such a
requirement with the TRIPS Agreement will depend on the
consequences arising from non-compliance. If the Requirement is
introduced into national laws as a condition of patentability, either
substantive or adjective, then there will be a conflict with the TRIPS
Agreement. However, this does not mean that law may not establish
the Requirement, but for that to happen, it will be necessary to
modify the nature of the sanction. Instead of imposing the
Requirement as a condition of patentability, which conflicts with the
TRIPS Agreement, WTO Members should make the enforceability of
patent rights dependent on compliance with the Requirement.
Party providing such resources. Such sharing shall be upon mutually agreed terms.
4. TRIPS Agreement, article 27.3(b):
Members may also exclude from patentability: . . . plants and animals other than
micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of plants or
animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes. However, Members
shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui
generis system or by any combination thereof. The provisions of this subparagraph
shall be reviewed four years after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27.3(b). The TRIPS Council launched the review of article
27.3(b) at its meeting of Dec. 1-2, 1999. See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Minutes of Meeting, WTO Doc. IP/C/M/21, ¶¶ 110-18 (Jan. 22, 1999).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/12
218.doc 08/24/00
2000]   Requiring Disclosure of the Origin of Genetic Resources 373
Part II of this Article describes the requirement that the origin of
genetic resources and prior informed consent in patent applications,
as proposed by different countries in at least two different
international fora: in the WTO, before the Council for TRIPS and the
General Council, and in the WIPO, before the Standing Committee
on Patents. Part III shows why there is a problem of compatibility
with the Requirement, as proposed, and the TRIPS Agreement.
Finally, Part IV presents a solution to the problem by indicating how
the Requirement should be incorporated into national, regional, or
international law without infringing the TRIPS Agreement. This
solution builds on the fraudulent procurement doctrine, as developed
and established by United States courts.
However, before describing the proposed Requirement, one must
understand that its relevance may be somewhat limited, depending on
the adopted legal criteria. As a matter of fact, the Requirement would
apply exclusively to the biotechnology field and only when natural
genetic resources, conserved in situ, are employed. When the active
components are isolated from those resources or even when they are
synthesized, the link between the invention and the resources may
become too weak to be of any significance.5 The same is true for ex
situ conserved resources. Furthermore, the Requirement only applies
in the context of patents and does not apply to trade secrets. It does
not apply to certificates of plant varieties or plant patents obtained by
breeding plant genetic resources.6 This limitation is a result of an
5. This point should be understood cum granum salis. Actually, the Requirement, if well
worded, should include the genetic information contained in genetic resources and not be
limited to the physical, tangible, and natural material. In addition, where the Requirement
covers genetic resources, derived products, and substances as well, it follows that it reaches
patents in the chemical field. Thus, it covers the whole spectrum of the biotechnology-based as
well as the chemistry-based pharmaceutical industries, in addition to related industries such as
cosmetics, dietary products, etc. For an example of provisions adopting the Requirement in that
broad sense, see the text of the relevant Andean Decision No. 391 provisions infra note 17 and
accompanying text.
6. It is assumed that the same exceptions to rights admitted by UPOV are also applicable
in the context of plant patents. Actually, it is this assumption that explains the sort of farmers’
exemption adopted by the European Directive on Biotechnology in the context of patents
covering genetic plant material. The same reasoning, mutatis mutandis, could be invoked in
order to extend the ten-year transitional period that applies to product patent protection in areas
of technology more difficult to protect within the territory of Member developing countries
(article 65.4 of the TRIPS Agreement) to sui generis plant variety protection. In this sense, the
equivalence between patent and plant variety protection that article 27.3(b) established should
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extensive application of article 15(1)(iii) of the 1991 Act of the
Union for Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) Convention,
which establishes that the breeder’s right shall not extend to acts done
for the purpose of breeding other varieties.7 Given that this exception
applies to the results of human creative efforts in developing new
uniform and stable plant varieties, it follows that the exception also
applies to landraces (i.e., plant varieties which have not yet acquired
stability) and natural genetic resources.
II. THE REQUIREMENT
The requirement that applicants for patents in the field of
biotechnology disclose the source of the genetic resources eventually
used as raw materials or tools in the inventive activity and, in
addition, provide information (and evidence, if any, by means of
contracts or licenses) on prior informed consent is not a new concept.
It is a consequence of article 15 of the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD), which deals with access to genetic resources.8
Paragraph four states that access, where granted by the country of
origin, “shall be on mutually agreed terms and subject to provisions
of this Article.”9 Paragraph five adds that access “shall be subject to
prior informed consent of the Contracting Party providing such
resources, unless otherwise determined by that Party.”10 In addition,
paragraph seven establishes that the contracting parties shall take
legislative action in order to ensure “sharing . . . the benefits arising
cut both ways.
Mathematically speaking, if A = B (patent protection for plant varieties = sui generis
protection for plant varieties) and A = C (product patent protection = 10 years transitional
period), it follows that B = C (sui generis protection for plant varieties = 10 years transitional
period). Recently, at a seminar on enforcement of intellectual property Rights (San José, Nov.
22-23, 1999), organized by the WIPO and the Government of Costa Rica, the President of the
Parliamentary Commission on the Implementation of the TRIPS Agreement stated that Costa
Rica was enjoying the 10 year period established by article 65.4 for the adoption of a sui
generis plant variety protection statute. This discussion, however, is beyond the scope of this
Article.
7. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec. 2, 1961,
as revised in Geneva on Nov. 10, 1972, on Oct. 23, 1978, and on Mar. 10, 1991.
8. CBD, supra note 2, art. 15.
9. Id. at ¶ 4.
10. Id. at ¶ 5.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/12
218.doc 08/24/00
2000]   Requiring Disclosure of the Origin of Genetic Resources 375
from the commercial and other utilization of genetic resources with
the Contracting Party providing such resources.”11 Article 8(j) of the
CBD establishes that national legislation should “encourage the
equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of
knowledge, innovations, and practices of indigenous and local
communities… relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity.”12
The argument for the Requirement is that researchers and
companies from developed countries are using genetic resources
extracted from biodiversity-rich countries without appropriate
authorization in order to obtain new technologies, inventions,
techniques, and products. Furthermore, in many instances members
of local, traditional communities, who cooperate with researchers to
provide the lead for the identification and discovery of those genetic
resources and their active principles, seldom receive payment. The
press has described this frequently as “biopiracy” and this
characterization has generated strong public indignation in
developing countries.
In order to maintain a record of inventions that were developed
with the use of genetic resources conserved in situ and/or traditional
or indigenous knowledge,13 it has been proposed that patent
applications disclose this information. In the absence of proper
authorization, the countries of origin could then make the patent
holders accountable for any infringement of the national laws
implementing the mentioned CBD provisions. In other words, a
specific provision of patent law would serve the implementation of an
environmentally related treaty.14
So far, the Requirement has been incorporated into two statutes:
Andean Decision No. 391 of August 16, 1996, which establishes a
11. Id. at ¶ 7.
12. Id. at art. 8, § j.
13. For a general discussion on indigenous knowledge and a suggestion on how to protect
it by means of a sui generis data base mechanism, see Nuno Carvalho, From the Shaman’s Hut
to the Patent Office: How Long and Winding is the Road?, 40, 41 REV. ABPI 3 (1999).
14. See Brendan Tobin, Certificates of Origin, A Role for IPR regimes in Securing Prior
Informed Consent, paper presented at the Workshop on Regulating Access to Genetic
Resources (organized by ACTS, IILS, IUCN, SPDA, WRI), Jakarta, Indonesia, Nov. 4-5, 1995.
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Common Regime on Access to Genetic Resources;15 and the
Biodiversity Law (No. 7788) of Costa Rica enacted May 27, 1998.16 
Under both statutes patent applicants are obliged to provide patent
offices with information concerning the origin of the genetic resource
in question and some proof of prior informed consent from
government authorities as well as traditional knowledge holders,
whenever the resource will be obtained through their technical
knowledge. As an intellectual property-related proposal, it could be
expected that it would find its way to the two intergovernmental
15. Common Regime on Access to Genetic Resources, Andean Decision No. 391, Andean
Community of Nations (July 2, 1996). Colombia informed the SCP, at its meeting of Sept. 6-14,
1999, that the Requirement would also be included in Decision 344 (Common Provisions on
Industrial Property) by means of an amendment. Decision 344 is undergoing a complete
revision in order to make it compatible with the TRIPS Agreement.
Two Supplementary Provisions of the Andean Decision No. 391 set up the Requirement in
the following terms:
SECOND- The Member Countries shall not acknowledge rights, including intellectual
property rights, over genetic resources, by-products or synthesized products and
associated intangible components, that were obtained or developed through an access
activity that does not comply with the provisions of this Decision.
Furthermore, the Member Country affected may request nullification and bring such
actions as are appropriate in countries that have conferred rights or granted protective
title documents.
THIRD- The Competent National Offices on Intellectual Property shall require the
applicant to give the registration number of the access contract and supply a copy of it
as a prerequisite for granting the respective right, when they are certain or there are
reasonable indications that the products or processes whose protection is being
requested have been obtained or developed on the basis of genetic resources or their
by-products which originated in one of the Member Countries.
The Competent National Authority and the Competent National Offices on Intellectual
Property shall set up systems for exchanging information about the authorized access
contracts and intellectual property rights granted.
English version available at <http://www.comunidadandina.org>, the official website of the
Andean Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela).
16. Article 81 of the Biodiversity Law of Costa Rica establishes that:
Both the National Seed Office and the Registers of Intellectual and Industrial Property
shall consult with the Technical Office of CONAGEBIO before granting intellectual or
industrial property protection to innovations involving elements of biodiversity. The
certificate of origin issued by the Technical Office of the Commission and the prior
informed consent shall be provided.
Justified opposition from the Technical Office will prohibit registration of a patent or protection
for the innovation.”
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organizations that cover patent matters: the WTO and the WIPO.17
Discussions on a proposed amendment to article 29 of the TRIPS
Agreement will be discussed below.
At the meeting of the WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of
Patents (SCP) on September 6-14, 1999, Colombia proposed the
following language to be included in the proposed Patent Law Treaty
(PLT):
1. All industrial property protection shall guarantee the
protection of the country’s biological and genetic heritage.
Consequently, the grant of patents or registrations18 that relate
to elements of that heritage shall be subject to their having
been acquired legally.
2. Every document shall specify the registration number of the
contract affording access to genetic resources and a copy
thereof where the goods or services19 for which protection is
sought have been manufactured or developed from genetic
resources, or products thereof, of which one of the member
countries is the country of origin.
Strictly speaking, the Requirement, to the extent it concerns
information that does not relate directly to the activity of inventing,
17. It should be noted that, contrary to the common misunderstanding, it is not correct to
say that the WTO and WIPO are two organizations with the goal of promoting respect for
intellectual property rights. The WTO does not have such a goal. The purpose of the WTO is to
promote free trade. Protection of intellectual property, under the WTO’s perspective, is a
valuable goal only to the extent that differences in national laws may lead to discrimination—
and, therefore, constitute barriers to trade. If WTO Members decide that intellectual property
may itself constitute a barrier against trade, they may seek lowering the levels of protection of
authors and inventors. WTO Members have decided, for example, that the protection of moral
rights is not a trade-related aspect, thus it has been excluded from the TRIPS Agreement. See
TRIPS Agreement, Art. 9.1 (under which non-compliance with article 6bis of the Berne
Convention may not be scrutinized by the dispute settlement mechanism).
The same could be said if WTO Members had accepted to include the issue of minimum
labor standards in the agenda of negotiations of the suspended new round. The fact that the
WTO might look into labor issues should not lead to the conclusion that the WTO and the
International Labour Office (ILO) have similar goals.
18. Since the proposal was submitted to the SCP, one could expect it referred only to
patents. But the fact that the proposals mentions “registrations” as well might lead to the
conclusion that its subscribers would wish to have it extended to future discussions on plant
variety protection— at a different forum: the UPOV.
19. Columbia has indicated that this text in English should read “products or processes.”
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does not characterize the invention itself. In this sense, it is not a
“substantive” requirement. Unlike novelty, non-obviousness, utility,
and unity— the four patentability requirements that concern the
substance, i.e., the very essence of the inventive activity— the
Requirement is an accessory, which relates to the invention
colaterally. A parallel can be found in the requirement that the patent
applicant, where the invention was invented as part of the work
performed under a contract with the government, furnishes any
document containing a statement which indicates any government
licensing rights in the invention and identifies the government
contract.20 However, even though the Requirement is not a
“substantive issue,” the fact that it has been proposed as a condition
of patentability makes it an inappropriate matter for the Standing
Committee to handle. The current scope of negotiations on a Patent
Law Treaty (PLT) is limited to procedural matters not leading to
patentability. Of course, the first part of the Colombian proposal
makes the Requirement a condition of patentability. Although it
received support from a number of developing countries, it is not a
surprise that some developed country members of WIPO rejected the
proposal on the grounds that it “was not appropriate for inclusion in
the draft Treaty.”21 As a result of this discussion, WIPO has decided
to convene a meeting on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources
in April 2000 to examine the issue (and other issues arising from the
interface between the CBD and the TRIPS Agreement) in preparation
20. The United States has proposed that this requirement be included as an amendment to
the Patent Cooperation Treaty Regulations. See Proposed item (vi) to Rule 51bis (Certain
National Requirements Under Article 27 [of the PCT]), doc. WIPO PCT/A/28/2, of Jan. 28,
2000. Two main differences between the Disclosure Requirement and the U.S. proposal may be
indicated. Firstly, the U.S. proposal is not a patentability condition. Article 27 of the PCT only
addresses formal requirements. Paragraph 5 makes it clear that both the Treaty and the
regulations are not intended to be construed as prescribing anything that would limit the
freedom of each Contracting State “to prescribe such substantive conditions of patentability as
it desires.” Paragraph 6 adds that “The national law may require that the applicant furnish
evidence in respect of any substantive condition of patentability prescribed by such law.”
Secondly, unlike the Colombian proposal, the U.S. proposal it is not mandatory. Countries that
do not wish to adopt it may not do so.
21. Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, 3d Sess. WIPO Doc. SCP/3/11, ¶ 205.
The countries that supported the proposal were Bolivia, Paraguay, China, Namibia, Cameroon,
Mexico, South Africa, Chile, Cuba, India, Kenya, Costa Rica, and Barbados. The countries that
disagreed were Germany, the United States, Japan, France, the Republic of Korea, Romania,
and Finland (speaking on behalf of the European Communities and their Member States).
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for the Diplomatic Conference that will negotiate the adoption of the
PLT in May 2000.
III. THE PROBLEM
The issue is whether the Requirement described above complies
with the standards concerning the availability of patent rights
established by the TRIPS Agreement. In this framework, the relevant
provisions of the Agreement are: article 27.1 on patentable subject-
matter; article 29 on conditions on patent applicants; article 62 on
acquisition and maintenance of intellectual property rights and related
inter partes procedures; and article 32 on revocation and forfeiture of
patents.
Article 27.1 lists the substantive conditions of patentability:
“[P]atents shall be available for any inventions  . . . provided they are
new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial
application.” A footnote to this article explains that the terms
“inventive step” and “capable of industrial application” may be
deemed by a member state to be synonymous with the terms “non-
obvious” and “useful,” respectively, which are commonly employed
in U.S. legal practice.22 These are substantive conditions in the sense
that they refer to the invention per se, because they result from the
technical characteristics of the invention.
The Requirement quite obviously is not compatible with article
27.1. The manner of obtaining genetic resources used in the
development of inventions is an external condition. The outcome of
the inventive activity is indeed independent of the ways and means
employed to reach it. The situation that arises from an invention
22. A footnote was added as a manner of accommodating the differences in language
between the negotiating proposals presented by the European Communities and the United
States. However, the first report presented by the Chairman to the Negotiating Group opted for
combining the two proposals into a single provision:
Patents shall be [available] [granted] for [any inventions, whether products or
processes, in all fields of technology,] [all products and processes] which are new,
which are unobvious or involve an inventive step and which are useful or industrially
applicable.
Text that has not been agreed to appears inside the brackets. The Brussels draft adopted the
current language of the first part of article 27.1, including the footnote, GATT Doc.
MTN.TNC/W/35/Rev.1 (Dec. 3, 1990).
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derived from the use of genetic resources that have been illegally
extracted from their in situ environment is similar to the situation of
an invention that has been developed with the assistance of a stolen
microscope. This event would infringe the common law but not
patent law under article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. In both
situations inventors would still be entitled to the patent, provided the
conditions of patentability were met. Nonetheless they would be
subject to criminal and civil liability for stealing (both the genetic
resources, depending on the existence of appropriate legislation, and
the microscope) in the country from which the resources had been
taken.
Article 29 of the TRIPS Agreement contains disclosure
conditions. Disclosure of the invention must be in a manner
sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be carried out by a
person skilled in the art. An optional condition WTO members are
free to adopt is the disclosure of the best mode for carrying out the
invention. Another optional condition is the requirement that an
applicant for a patent provide information concerning the applicant’s
corresponding foreign applications and grants (as well as rejections).
This last condition is aimed at assisting the examination of patent
applications in developing countries where insufficient human and
technical resources jeopardize the adequate assessment of the
substantive conditions of patentability. However, it may not impair
the principle of independence of patents, as established by the Paris
Convention23 and incorporated by the TRIPS Agreement.24
As a matter of course, the present language of article 29 is not an
appropriate framework for the Requirement. The indication of the
origin of the genetic resources and of other circumstances related to
their acquisition is not generally necessary for the invention to be
carried out by a person skilled in the art. Where the biotechnological
invention does require the use of the natural resource to be carried
out, the knowledge of where to obtain the resource may be relevant
23. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 4bis(1) (1967):
Patents applied for in the various countries of the Union by nationals of countries of
the Union shall be independent of patents obtained for the same invention in other
countries, whether members of the Union or not.
24. See TRIPS Agreement art. 2.
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for the practical exploitation of the invention. In this context, the
United States’ statement at the November 24-25, 1997 meeting of the
WTO Committee on Trade and Environment applies: where the
source of the resource is unique, it must be disclosed under article
29.25 There is no need for additional language to be included in the
Agreement. However, sometimes the source of the material may be
relevant, even though it may not be of essence. In that case the
information may even constitute a trade secret. For instance, a natural
extract obtained in some particular geographical area may be more
effective than a similar extract obtained somewhere else. However,
the scope of article 29 does not reach beyond the obligation to
explain how the invention works. Therefore, the agreement does not
require disclosure of the material’s source where knowledge of that
source is not essential to reduce the invention into practice.
A third provision of the TRIPS Agreement deals with the
conditions that patent applicants may be required to meet by the law
of WTO Members. This provision is article 62, which constitutes the
entire part IV of the Agreement on acquisition and maintenance of
the intellectual property rights provided for under sections 2 through
6 of part II.26 Article 62 authorizes members to require compliance
with reasonable procedures as a condition of the acquisition or
maintenance of patents.27 The Agreement provides a few elements
that may help clarify what a reasonable procedure is but does not
define it.
First, article 62.1 establishes that such procedures and formalities
shall be consistent with the provisions of the Agreement. In other
words, they shall comply not only with the basic principles of the
Agreement, including the national treatment and the most-favored-
25. See infra note 49, and accompanying text.
26. Sections 1 and 7 of part II are not included because neither copyright nor trade secrets
are subject to formalities. This does not mean that those categories of intellectual property
rights are completely strange to formalities. Fixation of works upon which the protection of
copyright may depend is undoubtedly a sort of formality, though not an administrative one. The
same goes for the need of trade secret holders to prove that they have taken reasonable steps
under the circumstances to keep the information secret. See TRIPS art. 39(2)(c).
27. Article 62 applies to other types of intellectual property rights the acquisition of which
depends on administrative procedures, such as trademarks, geographical indications, industrial
designs and layout-designs of integrated circuits. This Article, however, is exclusively
concerned with patents.
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nation treatment principles but also with specific relevant
provisions.28 This means that a link exists between the reasonable
procedures admitted by article 62 and the conditions of patentability
established in section 5 of part II, namely article 27.1 and article 29.29
Second, article 62.2 clarifies that the procedures, subject to
compliance with the substantive conditions for acquisition of the
right established by article 27.1, should permit the granting of the
right within a reasonable period of time so as to avoid unwarranted
curtailment of the period of protection.
Therefore, it appears that reasonable procedures are those that
assist patent administrations to assess whether the substantive
conditions, such as novelty, inventive step, and industrial
applicability have been met by the invention the patentability of
which is under examination. In addition, moderate fees are admitted.
This understanding results not only from the reading of the text of the
TRIPS Agreement, but also from the history of the negotiations.
During the negotiations members never proposed that conditions that
did not relate to the characteristics of the invention or the fees to be
charged by patent offices would be admitted.
For example, during the first part of the unsuccessful negotiations
that led to the Montreal mid-term conference in 1988, some parties to
the GATT had already presented their views on what they understood
to be the main trade problems connected to intellectual property
rights. The European Communities complained that procedural
differences and complexities in some contexts made it more difficult
for Community firms to obtain protection outside the Community
than their competitors within the Community. The Nordic countries,
Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, stated the similar view that a
28. See TRIPS Agreement art. 3 and 4.
29. See DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT— DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS
239 (1998):
As regards other intellectual property rights [other than copyright and undisclosed
information], the rules set out in Article 62 apply where reasonable procedures and
formalities are required as a condition for the acquisition or maintenance of such
rights. The general provisions and principles of the TRIPS Agreement apply. For
instance, as regards conditions of disclosure of the invention in a patent application,
Article 29 applies and is not superseded by other acquisition rules.
Id. (emphasis added).
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potential trade problem in the field of national procedures to protect
intellectual property rights was related to the complexity of the
procedures as such. Switzerland expressed the concern that
complicated, costly, and lengthy national procedures made it difficult
for small or medium-sized undertakings to gain access to the markets
of other countries. Canada also expressed its view that discriminatory
and non-transparent procedures increased uncertainty in international
trade of goods and services.  In a nutshell, even before concrete
proposals on the would-be TRIPS Agreement were put on the table,
parties to the GATT had already made it clear that there was the need
for procedures that were simple, short, and cheap so that certainty as
to the grant and enforcement of patent rights were increased, and at
the same time the length and the burden of administrative
procurement were reduced.
These points have been taken into account by the different proposals
presented to the GATT. The first proposal, submitted by the
European Communities, contained the text that was incorporated
entirely into the final language of the TRIPS Agreement with minor
changes.30
30. The negotiations in the Uruguay Round on TRIPS started really after the European
Communities tabled their proposal. See GATT, Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
IPRs, Communication from the European Communities, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/68
(Mar. 29, 1990). Proposals from the United States, Japan, a group of developing countries, and
Switzerland followed this proposal. Australia submitted a proposal on geographical indications.
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European Communities
proposal
TRIPS Agreement
Part 4: Acquisition on
Intellectual Property Rights
and Related Inter-Partes
Procedures
Part IV – Acquisition and
Maintenance of Intellectual
Property Rights and Related
Inter Partes Procedures
Article 62
1. Members may require, as a
condition of the acquisition or
maintenance of the intellectual
property rights provided for
under Sections 2 through 6 of
Part II, compliance with
reasonable procedures and
formalities. Such procedures
and formalities shall be
consistent with the provisions
of this Agreement.
Article 1
Where the acquisition of an
intellectual property right
covered by this Annex is
subject to the intellectual
property right being granted or
registered, contracting parties
shall provide for procedures
which permit, subject to the
substantive conditions for
acquiring the intellectual
property right being fulfilled,
the granting or registration of
the right within a reasonable
period of time so as to avoid
that the period of protection is
unduly curtailed.
2. Where the acquisition of an
intellectual property right is
subject to the right being
granted or registered, Members
shall ensure that the procedures
for the grant or registration,
subject to compliance with the
substantive conditions for
acquisition of the right, permit
the granting or registration of
the right with a reasonable
period of time so as to avoid
unwarranted curtailment of the
period of protection.
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3. Article 4 of the Paris
Convention (1967) shall apply
mutatis mutandis to service
marks.
Article 2
Procedures concerning the
acquisition or renewal of such
intellectual property rights
shall be governed by the
general principles set out in
Part 3, Section 1, articles 2 and
3.
Article 3
Where the national law
provides for opposition,
revocation, cancellation or
similar inter-partes procedures,
they shall be expeditious,
effective, fair and equitable.
4. Procedures concerning the
acquisition or maintenance of
intellectual property rights and,
where a Member’s law
provides for such procedures,
administrative revocation and
inter partes procedures such as
opposition, revocation and
cancellation, shall be governed
by the general principles set
out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of
article 41.
Article 4
Final administrative decisions
concerning the acquisition of
an intellectual property right or
any other matter subject to an
inter-partes procedure referred
to in article 3 above, shall be
subject to the right of appeal in
a court of law or quasi-judicial
body.
5. Final administrative
decisions in any of the
procedures referred to under
paragraph 4 shall be subject to
review by a judicial or quasi-
judicial authority. However,
there shall be no obligation to
provide an opportunity for such
review of decisions in cases of
unsuccessful opposition or
administrative revocation,
provided that the grounds for
such procedures can be the
subject of invalidation
procedures.
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In the debate that followed the submission of the proposal by the
European Communities, it is worth noting that no party rejected the
principles on which the proposed concept of reasonable procedures
had been based. For example, a participant stated that the TRIPS
Agreement should not deal with procedural matters. Another
participant stated a preference for less broadly drafted provisions.
Another delegate wondered why article 3 of the proposal did not
contain the same reference to the general principles on enforcement
like article 2. However, no delegation present expressed outright
rejection of the proposal at that particular meeting of the negotiating
group.
In the Chairman’s report to the negotiating group, dated July 23,
1990, the proposed requirements of patentability were the following:
Requirements such as filing of an adequate disclosure in patent
application and payment of reasonable fees shall not be
considered inconsistent with the obligation to provide patent
protection;31
The owner of the patent shall have the obligation to disclose
prior to grant the invention in a clear and complete manner to
permit a person versed in the technical field to put the
invention into practice [and in particular to indicate the best
mode for carrying out the invention];32
The European Community proposal was incorporated ipsis
verbis.33
These precedents appear to indicate that the TRIPS Agreement
only admits three substantive requirements of patentability: novelty,
inventiveness, and industrial applicability. Requirements are strictly
limited to the need to inform the patent offices about the meeting of
these three requirements. The same reasoning applies to the other two
conditions allowed (not imposed) by article 29: the best mode
requirement is obviously not strange to the industrial applicability
31. This language was extracted from the US proposal of a draft Treaty.
32. This requirement was explicitly connected to the previous one by means of a cross-
reference.
33. See GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76 (July 23, 1990).
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condition; and the information concerning foreign applications and
grants (and denials) helps verify the findings on novelty and
inventiveness as established by patent offices in other countries. In
addition to these conditions, WTO Members may impose reasonable
procedures under article 62.1. The measure of reasonableness, as it
results from the history of negotiations, is assessed according to the
direct relationship of the procedures with the substantive
requirements established by article 27.1 and the conditions defined by
article 29. Other than the payment of reasonable fees, no procedures
may be imposed that are strange to the identification and/or
assessment of the three substantive conditions of patentability.
This rule can already be found in the first draft of the Patent Law
Treaty (PLT) (i.e., the substantive one, titled “Treaty Supplementing
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property as far
as Patents are Concerned”), in which the TRIPS Agreement has deep
roots.34 Article 3 of the PLT had rules on disclosure and description
of the inventions. Paragraph 1(a) of article 3 established that: “The
application shall disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear
and complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in
the art.” More importantly, paragraph 3 of article 3 established that,
“in respect of the disclosure or the description, no requirement
additional to or different from those provided for in this article and in
the relevant provisions of the Regulations may be imposed.”
As previously mentioned, there is another provision in section 5 of
part II of the TRIPS Agreement that is relevant to this issue. Article
32 provides that when revoking or forfeiting a patent, WTO Members
must give patent holders the opportunity to ask for a judicial review
34. Although the TRIPS Agreement added a new dimension to intellectual property— the
trade-related dimension— it is undeniable that the failure of the negotiations of the original PLT
convinced some parties to the GATT to include intellectual property in the ministerial
declaration of Punta del Este in 1986. It is worth noting, the mandate concerning the adoption
of substantive standards of intellectual property protection was merely exploratory, in a sharp
contrast with the mandate for the negotiating groups to adopt rules to prevent the trade of
illegitimate goods, which became the rules on enforcement, including the special requirements
related to border measures. On the other hand, it is undeniable that the language of the proposed
PLT strongly influenced the text of section 5 of part II (on Patents) of the TRIPS Agreement.
For example, article 28 of the TRIPS Agreement clearly draws inspiration from article 19,
alternative B of the PLT (Rights Conferred by the Patent), and article 34 of the TRIPS
Agreement is based on article 24, alternative B, of the PLT (Reversal of the Burden of Proof).
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of that decision. The extent to which national laws are free to adopt
grounds for revocation has been subject to discussions in the TRIPS
Council. This matter is relevant in the sense that both the Colombian
proposal (in the SCP as well as the Andean Decision No. 391) and
the Biodiversity Law of Costa Rica make the validity of the patent
dependent on the fulfillment of the Requirement. If a patent has been
granted without meeting the Requirement, arguably the invalidation
(or revocation) of the patent would follow. Then the question is
whether article 32 of the TRIPS Agreement allows the revocation of
patents on that specific ground. It appears that the answer is no.
The history of the negotiations shows that the United States
delegation was particularly worried about the revocation of patents.
In effect, it proposed specific language to be included in the
Agreement that would clearly establish that patents could be revoked
only for failing to meet the requirements of novelty, usefulness, and
nonobviousness.
The TRIPS Council later discussed the issue of revocation. In the
Committee on Trade and Environment, India’s representative
commented that the TRIPS Agreement did not preclude a member
from revoking a patent in order to serve general societal goals, such
as promoting technology transfer for environmentally sound
technologies. In reaction, the United States representative, at the
TRIPS Council meeting of July 22 to 25, 1996, said that, as a result
of the conjunction of articles 27, 29 and 33 of the TRIPS Agreement,
patents could not be revoked by members except on grounds that
would have justified denial of the grant of the patent on the
underlying application. Furthermore, article 32 only made review
procedures available and did not represent a substantive standard. 
Subsequently, the United States elaborated on these arguments in a
paper, Remarks on revocation of patents and the TRIPS Agreement,
circulated to WTO Members. 35
At the following meeting of the TRIPS Council, the view of the
United States received support from Japan, Switzerland, Norway,
Canada, the European Communities, and New Zealand. No other
35. See Council for Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Remarks on
Revocation of Patents and the TRIPS Agreement by the United States of America, WTO Doc.
IP/C/W/32 (Aug. 6, 1996).
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WTO Member supported India’s view. India continued to hold that
article 32 gave some leeway for members to dictate the grounds for
revocation of patents, referring to article 5 of the Paris Convention as
the applicable framework. In other words, when it referred to the
possibility of revoking patents on grounds other than the absence of
patentability requirements, India admitted that revocation was
possible only when the grant of compulsory licenses would not
prevent the abuses resulting from the exercise of the exclusive rights
conferred by the patent.36 The Japanese delegation explicitly noted
this aspect.37 It is worth noting that the current negotiations by the
PLT on procedural matters contains similar restrictions on the
possibility of revoking or invalidating patents.38
The problem is that to require that patent applicants identify the
source of genetic resources and give evidence of prior informed
consent as conditions of patentability conflicts with the TRIPS
Agreement. First, in the Agreement the conditions of patentability are
limited to novelty, inventiveness, and industrial applicability. Second,
the disclosure requirements are limited to the obligations established
by article 29. Third, it is not reasonable under article 62 to impose the
Requirement. Finally, the patent may not be revoked on the grounds
that the Requirement has not been met.
IV. THE SOLUTION
A.  A possible but improbable (at least in the short term) solution: to
incorporate the Requirement into the TRIPS Agreement
Since a problem of compatibility exists between the national or
36. For example, failure to work. See Paris Convention, art. 5(A)(1)-(3).
37. See Council for Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Remarks on
Revocation of Patents and the TRIPS Agreement by the United States of America, WTO Doc.
IP/C/M/9 Item F (Oct. 30, 1996).
38. See article 10 of the Basic Proposal for the Patent Law Treaty, submitted by the
Director General of WIPO to the Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of the Patent Law
Treaty, WIPO doc. PT/DC/3 (Nov. 11, 1999) stating: once granted, a patent may not be revoked
on the ground of non-compliance with one or more of the formal requirements, “except where
the non-compliance with the formal requirement occurred as a result of fraudulent intention.”
Those requirements refer to the form or contents of the application and the communication of
addresses.
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regional laws that adopt the Requirement and the TRIPS Agreement,
the most obvious solution might be to amend the TRIPS
Agreement.39 In the WTO India mentioned the Requirement for the
first time within the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE).40
In a communication on item 8 of the CTE, India noted that “the fair
and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the patenting and
commercial exploitation of genetic resources is not dealt with at all in
the TRIPS Agreement.”41 The two Agreements represent:
two significantly separate multilateral approaches to the
utilization of living resources. While TRIPS seeks to promote
and foster technological innovation by ensuring the certainty of
intellectual property protection and of world markets for at
least some biotechnological inventions, its provisions are silent
on how this protection can achieve the objective of sustainable
development, especially in developing countries.42
The Indian delegation added that the TRIPS Agreement and the
CBD presented two main contradictions. The first was the lack of any
conditions on patent applications to mention the origin of biological
or genetic resources and indigenous or traditional knowledge used in
the biotechnological field. The present mandatory conditions were
confined to disclosure of the invention. The second contradiction was
39. Another obvious solution might be to modify the requirement so as not to constitute a
condition of patentability. In that event, non-compliance might be punished by different
mechanisms, like administrative sanctions (a raise in maintenance fees, for example, provided
that they should be kept at reasonable levels, according to article 62 of the TRIPS Agreement).
In preparation for the WIPO meeting on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, which
will take place in April 2000, see supra note 21 and accompanying text, two countries have
informed that they do require patent applicants to disclose the origin of genetic resources used
in developing inventions. The sanctions, however, are merely of an administrative nature.
Those countries are China and Denmark. The problem with this solution, at least for
developing, biodiversity-rich countries might be its ineffectiveness in obliging importers of
biological resources to comply with laws or contracts on access. Those importers might prefer
to face the administrative sanctions rather than admitting the failure to disclose the origin of the
resources in order to avoid the payment of royalties or other contract obligations.
40. The CTE was established by the WTO General Council following a Decision taken by
the Ministers in Marrakech, on Apr. 15, 1994.
41. Item 8 of the CTE’s agenda is The Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and
the Convention on Biodiversity.
42. See The Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on
Biodiversity, WTO Doc. WT/CTE/W/65 ¶¶ 7, 12-14 and 16 (Sept. 29, 1997) (communication
from Indian delegation).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/12
218.doc 08/24/00
2000]   Requiring Disclosure of the Origin of Genetic Resources 391
the lack of provisions in the TRIPS Agreement concerning prior
informed consent of the country of origin and the knowledge-holder
of the biological raw material meant for usage in a patentable
invention. This needs to be reconciled with article 15.5 of the CBD.
In view of these two contradictions, India proposed that the TRIPS
Agreement incorporate an obligation on patent owners to execute
Transfer of Information Agreements for any traditional or indigenous
knowledge already in the public domain or a part of the recorded or
otherwise publicly accessible knowledge. This would give a concrete
shape to the laudable objective of benefit sharing incorporated in the
CBD.43
This proposal triggered different reactions at the CTE meeting of
September 22-24, 1997.44 Colombia, who made reference to Andean
Decision No. 391,45 and Malaysia, on behalf of the ASEAN, affirmed
their support. The United States initially reacted negatively.
Later at the CTE’s meeting of November 24-25, 1997, the United
States delegation produced extensive comments rebutting the Indian
proposal. On the one hand, access to genetic resources should be
governed by sets of laws other than intellectual property laws, such as
contracts, conservation, export controls, etc. On the other hand,
countries providing genetic resources must keep track of their use,
not the patent offices of other countries. Moreover,
[i]f the source of biological/genetic resource was unique, an
applicant would have to identify it so that a person skilled in
the art would be able to carry out the invention . . .. Requiring
additional disclosure would increase the costs of research
because of the record keeping required, thereby reducing
research and increasing the costs of products.
In conclusion, the purpose of the TRIPS Agreement was “to
establish minimum levels of IPR protection, not to specify contractual
obligations governments were to impose regarding access to genetic
43. Id.
44. See Committee on Trade and Environment, Report of Meeting Held on 22-24
September 1997, WTO Doc. WTE/CTE/M/15 (Nov. 20, 1997).
45. For a discussion of the Andean decision see supra Part 2.
Washington University Open Scholarship
218.doc 08/24/00
392 Re-Engineering Patent Law [Vol. 2:371
materials in other countries’ territory.” 46
The United States delegation made four basic arguments:
a) to amend article 29 of the TRIPS Agreement would fail to
address the many situations where the genetic resources have
been used to create non-patentable technology;
b) given that patent rights are eminently territorial, compliance
with the CBD could not be monitored and enforced where the
patents were obtained in countries other than the one from
which the genetic resources were originated;
c) in many cases the inventor does not know the origin of the
genetic resources; and
d) the introduction of a new condition on patent applications
would burden and slow down the administrative procedures
leading to the grants.
Two years later in the TRIPS Council, India used the opportunity
given by the review of article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement to
repeat its proposal.47 At the TRIPS Council meeting on July 7-8, 1999,
the India delegation proposed that the objective of harmonising the
approaches to the utilisation of living resources in the CBD and in the
TRIPS Agreement “could be operationalized if an obligation was
imposed in the TRIPS Agreement to share benefits through material
transfer agreements and transfer of information agreements . . ..  Such
an obligation could be incorporated through inclusion of provisions in
article 29 of the TRIPS Agreement, which dealt with conditions on
patent applicants, requiring a clear mention of the biological source of
the material and the country of origin.”48
The TRIPS Council did not examine this proposal at that meeting,
46. See WTO Doc. WT/CTE/M/16 ¶ 89-92 (Dec. 19, 1997).
47. See supra note 4.
48. WTO Doc. IP/C/M/24 ¶ 81 (Aug. 17, 1999). Actually, if the Indian proposal had been
taken up, there might be a problem concerning the scope of the Council’s mandate. Indeed, it is
article 27.3(b), which is included in the built-in agenda of the WTO, not article 29. The
mandate of the TRIPS Council probably would not cover an eventual review of article 29. The
solution might be to leave article 29 as the framework for establishing general conditions on
patent applications and adopt article 27.3(b) with special conditions as applied especially to
patents for biotechnology inventions.
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although several WTO members stated interest in discussing the links
between the CBD and the TRIPS Agreement. In preparation of the
subsequent meeting of the TRIPS Council, the United States submitted
a paper with comments on the Indian proposal.49 The paper suggests
that the best mode to put the CBD in practice, with respect to genetic
resources, would be to require that parties seeking access to genetic
resources or traditional knowledge enter into a contract with the
sovereign entity grant that access. The paper states the Requirement
would be:
an extremely ineffective way for countries that are the source
of genetic resources or traditional knowledge. Monitoring
copies of publications from patent offices around the world in
search of notices of genetic resources or traditional knowledge
would [be] an onerous task. If the secrecy of results of research
using particular resources or knowledge can be maintained
while those results are commercialised, parties might be
encouraged to protect their rights through trade secrets rather
than patents, in which case, no information would be available
at all. In addition, imposing additional requirements on all
patent applicants only increases the cost of obtaining patents
that would have a greater adverse effect on individual
inventors, non-profit entities, and small and medium sized
businesses, including those in developing countries.50
These differences remained unsolved at the TRIPS Council
meeting on November 20-22, 1999.51 However, the link between
article 29 of the TRIPS Agreement and article 15 of the CBD did not
receive attention from many WTO members at that meeting. The
European Communities supported the view of the United States.
Kenya, South Africa, and Pakistan agreed with India. Norway
recommended that the Indian proposal should be seriously
considered. It appears that the perspective of the imminent
Ministerial Conference in Seattle prejudiced the whole debate in
October. WTO members, particularly developing country members
49. See WTO Doc. IP/C/W/162 (Oct. 29, 1999).
50. See id. at 5-6.
51. See Bridges, Oct.-Nov. 1999 Issue, page 10.
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appeared to believe that negotiations on access to genetic resources
and the protection of traditional knowledge could move forward in a
new multilateral round. This may have diminished their interest in the
debate at the TRIPS Council.
Parallel to this discussion, several WTO members proposed to the
General Council, in the course of the preparations for the Third
Ministerial Conference in Seattle, that the next round of negotiations
should encompass the adoption of the Requirement by the TRIPS
Agreement.52 Given the failure in launching the round, it is
improbable that the issue is subject to developments in the WTO
soon, either as a component of the built-in agenda or as an element of
new negotiations. Therefore, the adoption of the Requirement by the
TRIPS Agreement is not a solution in the near future.53
B.  A feasible solution: compliance with the Requirement as a
condition of enforcement of the rights, rather than as a condition of
patentability, under the fraudulent procurement doctrine
To make patentability of inventions derived directly or indirectly
from natural genetic resources dependent on the indication of their
52. Those countries are: India, Zambia, Jamaica, Kenya, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania,
Uganda, and Venezuela. See Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference, WTO Doc.
WT/GC/W/282 (Aug. 6, 1999) (communication from Venezuela delegation); Preparations for
the 1999 Ministerial Conference, WTO Doc. WT/GC/W/225 (July 2, 1999) (communication
from Indian delegation); Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference— Proposals on IPR
Issues, WTO Doc. WT/GC/W/147 (Feb. 18, 1999) (communication from Indian delegation).
53. The TRIPS Agreement will be reviewed in 2000, under article 71.1. However, this
provision does not call for the Agreement to be amended necessarily, as it refers to a simple
review of its implementation. At most, the review might require a mere fine tuning of those
provisions the implementation of which would have shown to be practically unfeasible. Two
further points should be taken into account. First, the Council for TRIPS will spend the next
two years reviewing the implementing legislation of developing countries (24 countries in the
course of 2000, the remainder in 2001). Therefore, it is unlikely that an effective and useful
review under article 71.1 may start before completion of that exercise. Second, the TRIPS
Council deals with intellectual property rights only; it does not provide a multilateral set where
different trade interests could be bargained; as in the General Council. In other words, in the
TRIPS Council, WTO Members can negotiate around intellectual property standards only. They
cannot bargain tariffs in agriculture or textiles in exchange of concessions in the intellectual
property area. This reason explains why the TRIPS Council has been unable to conclude the
built-in agenda (which covers three items: geographical indications, under article 24.2, patent
protection, under article 27.3(b), and the application of non-violation complaints in the context
of intellectual property rights, under article 64.3).
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origin and/or the evidence of prior informed consent infringes articles
27, 29, 62, and 32 of the TRIPS Agreement. However, this does not
mean that the TRIPS Agreement prohibits WTO members from
adopting patent law provisions intended to secure compliance with
the provisions of the Convention on Biodiversity. The Agreement
does prohibit provisions that leads to the rejection of patent
applications or the revocation of patents.
It is a matter of course that the legal system of a party to the
Biodiversity Convention should be able to secure that compliance.
Various statutes that are not limited to biodiversity law or contract
law may have a bearing on access to genetic resources and economic
gains resulting from their utilization. Statutes should include patent
law to the extent it may contribute to induce benefit sharing.
Therefore, patent applicants should be required in those countries that
have adopted rules on access to genetic resources to indicate their
origin, if it is known or can be determined by reasonable means.  On
the other hand, it seems reasonable and appropriate that the
acquisition and enforcement of rights in inventions knowingly
derived directly or indirectly from an illegal act, such as the
unauthorized acquisition of genetic resources, be deemed abusive.
The legal framework for this understanding has been established
by article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement. Paragraph 1 authorizes WTO
members to adopt measures necessary to promote the public interest
in sectors of vital importance to their socioeconomic and
technological development, provided such measures are consistent
with the provisions of the Agreement. As a result of this language, if
the implementation of benefit sharing under the CBD framework is a
matter of vital importance both from an economic and a technological
perspective, then biodiversity and the knowledge of its use in a
sustainable manner are the comparative advantage of developing
countries in international trade and the Requirement may be adopted
by national patent laws.54 Its consistency with the other provisions of
the TRIPS Agreement is indisputable, provided the grant or the
54. See Protection of Traditional Knowledge: A Global Intellectual Property Issue, WIPO
Doc. WIPO/RT/LDC/14 (Sept. 30, 1999), prepared by the International Bureau of WIPO and
distributed at the High-Level Interregional Roundtable on Intellectual Property for the Least
Developed Countries (LDCs).
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validity of the patent does not depend on applicants meeting the
Requirement— otherwise it would be deemed unreasonable under
article 62.
In addition, paragraph 2 of article 8 authorizes WTO members to
adopt appropriate measures to prevent the abuse of intellectual
property rights.55 Therefore, WTO members are authorized to
establish legal sanctions to patent owners that fail to meet the
Requirement. However, those sanctions may not include the
revocation of the patent, but nothing prevents them to deem the
enforcement of patent rights illegitimately obtained as abusive.
Therefore, the fraudulent procurement doctrine may be applied as
developed by U.S. common law in the context of the Requirement.
The United States Supreme Court in Walker Process Equipment,
Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp. set out the fraudulent
procurement doctrine.56 In Walker Process the patent owner sued
Walker Process Equipment for patent infringement.57 The defendant
alleged that Food Machinery obtained its patent in bad faith knowing
it had no basis for a patent.58 The patent applicant fraudulently swore
that he neither knew nor believed that the invention had been in
public use more than one year before filing the application.59
However, the patent owner himself publicly used the invention prior
to the bar date. The Court said given that the dispute involved
fraudulent procurement “the action does not directly seek the patent’s
annulment.”60 The Court accepted that an attempt to enforce patent
rights obtained by fraudulent means might constitute an antitrust
violation under section 2 of the Sherman Act.61
55. Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement, therefore, is the provision that allows the link
between international intellectual property standards and the implementation of the CBD in the
context of article 16 of the CBD (Access to and Transfer of technology). CBD article 16 refers
to consistency with the adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights as well
as accordance with international law, which includes the TRIPS Agreement. The ongoing
debate on the compatibility between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD is moot. The
Agreements are, per definition, compatible. What may be (but should not be) incompatible is
the respective implementation.
56. 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
57. Id. at 173.
58. Id. at 173-74
59. Id. at 174.
60. Id. at 176.
61. 382 U.S. at 178. For a discussion on fraudulent patent procurement as an antitrust
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Subsequently, lower courts refined the doctrine of fraudulent
procurement. These courts qualified it as a consequence of the duty
of patent applicants to provide patent examiners with complete
information in order to allow a thorough examination of the
substantive conditions of patentability. If patent applicants fail to be
candid on matters that may have an impact on the final decision on
patentability, such as novelty or inventiveness, then the patent may be
invalidated. When the lack of candor regards matters that are not
essential to the grant or rejection of the patent, then fraudulent
procurement is sanctioned by non-enforceability.62 Enforceability is
restored when the patent owner corrects the misrepresentations or
other inequitable conducts— in other words, when he cleans his
hands.
For example, in SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, SCM
sought a judgment declaring, among other things, that one of
defendant’s patents had been fraudulently obtained and thus, in
asserting rights under the patent, the defendant had violated section 2
of the Sherman Act.63 Judge McLean concluded that SCM had not
passed the “but for” test in the sense that it had not proved that, in the
absence of the misrepresentation, the patent would not have been
granted.64 However, this conclusion did not dispose of the matter;
“We still have to deal with the doctrine of ‘unclean hands,’” the
judge wrote.65 However, the line between fraud, which invalidates a
patent, and unclean hands, which bars its enforcement, was a
shadowy one.66 The court cited several decisions requiring complete
candor and full disclosure of a patent applicant in his dealings with
the Patent Office.67 Therefore, the court concluded it was not required
violation, see L.A. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 512-14 (1977); and H. HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 291-93 (1994).
62. The duty of candor has been linked by some courts to the ex parte nature of
procedures. It should not be so. Even in countries that adopt inter partes procedures, the
difficulty of patent examiners to accurately assess the novelty and inventiveness of inventions,
particularly when absolute standards are adopted, is likewise extremely high. Patent examiners,
therefore, must rely always on the candor of applicants, regardless of the nature of the
applicable procedure.
63. 318 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
64. Id. at 449.
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. Id.
67. Id.
Washington University Open Scholarship
218.doc 08/24/00
398 Re-Engineering Patent Law [Vol. 2:371
that the inequitable conduct has a but for effect on the granting of the
patent as a prerequisite to a court’s refusal to enforce it.68 Agreeing to
Judge Wright’s opinion in Corning Glass Works v. Anchor Hocking
Glass Corp.,69 Judge McLean recognized that no one could tell with
certainty what would have happened if the patent applicant had
behaved with candor.70 Since a patent affects the public interest and
considering the patent owner withheld relevant facts from the Patent
Office, the only rule that could adequately discourage conduct of that
sort was to conclude “that this court should not enforce a patent
obtained under these circumstances.”71
The solution to the problem of requiring that patent applicants
disclose the origin of genetic resources and prior informed consent
can be obtained from that rationale. Considering that patents affect a
public interest, biodiversity-rich countries may affect patents granted
for chemical or biotechnological product inventions directly or
indirectly derived from genetic resources based on the CBD’s
objective of promoting benefit sharing. In this manner patents
become consistent, not in conflict, with public policies adopted in
response to environmental concerns. As the Supreme Court stated in
one of its most quoted statements, the public policy which places
inventors’ rights within a constitutional frame72 “forbids the use of
the patent to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not
granted by the Patent Office and which it is contrary to public policy
to grant.”73 The Supreme Court has consistently held that inventors’
68. Id.
69. 253 F. Supp. 461, 470 (D.Del. 1961).
Even though the misrepresentations made to the Patent Office are not legally material
to the issuance of a patent, nevertheless, this Court, being a court of equity, can and
should refuse to enforce the patent if the Court finds the patentee made intentional
misrepresentations to the patent examiner, i.e., if the patentee came into court with
unclean hands.
Id.
70. 318 F. Supp. at 449.
71. Id. at 449-450.
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8:
The Congress shall have the power . . . to promote the progress of . . . useful arts, by
securing for limited times to . . . inventors the exclusive rights to their respective . . .
discoveries.
73. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942).
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rights are subject to the convenience of public policy.74 The language
of paragraph 1 of article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement does not read
otherwise.
To make the granting and validity of those patents dependent on
the meeting of the Requirement conflicts with the obligations
imposed on WTO members by the TRIPS Agreement. Nevertheless,
courts should be able to sanction the lack of candor of patent
applicants who knowingly failed to disclose the source in a manner
that would facilitate benefit sharing, as established by article 15 of
the CBD. Actually, the determination that the concealment of
information might lead to the implementation of public policies
concerning benefit sharing is fraudulent is a matter of law.
Consequently, any attempt to enforce patent rights thus obtained
would be an abuse of rights. In compliance with paragraph 2 of
article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement and given that infringement both
direct and contributory is a tort,75 it can be imposed that one must
have clean hands to obtain relief from an equity court.76 Only after a
patentee abandons its unlawful practice and the effects of the misuse
are completely dissipated may it sue infringers.77 In the case of the
Requirement, this implies that patent owners would have to disclose
the origin and obtain the appropriate authorizations from the
appropriate stakeholders (governments, local authorities, and
traditional knowledge holders) before the patent rights could be
enforced against infringers.
74. See, e.g., Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1945)
(stating that “the primary purpose of our patent system is not reward of the individual but the
advancement of the arts and sciences”); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278
(1942) (stating that “The promotion of the progress of science and the useful arts is the ‘main
object’;  reward of inventors is secondary and merely a means to that end”); Morton Salt Co. v.
G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942) (stating that “the grant to the inventor of the
special privilege of a patent monopoly carries out a public policy adopted by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, ‘to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’ . . .”);
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917) (stating
“[T]his court has consistently held that the primary purpose of our patent laws is not the
creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents but is ‘to promote the progress of science
and useful arts’”).
75. See, e.g., Carbice Corp. of Am. v. American Patents Dev.. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33
(1931).
76. See, e.g., Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 1374, 1377 (Ct. C1. 1971).
77. See, e.g., B.B. Chemical C. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 498 (1942).
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In sum, the national or regional laws of WTO members that
restrict access to the genetic resources found in their territory may
require that patent applicants indicate, if known, the source of genetic
resources directly or indirectly used in obtaining the invention. The
lack of that indication by a patent applicant who knew or had reason
to know constitutes fraud. Therefore, the enforcement of the resulting
patent therefore, may be deemed an abuse of rights.
In the same vein, if one obtains the genetic resource directly or
indirectly used in making a patented invention in a country that has
adopted legislation requiring prior informed consent, the failure to
obtain that consent constitutes fraud and, therefore, an attempt to
enforce that patent may be deemed an abuse of rights.  In both cases
the patentee’s cleaning his hands by providing the missing
information and/or obtaining the required prior consent, would purge
the abuse of rights.
Importantly, this proposal would not raise transaction costs to an
unacceptable level, making patents cost ineffective. The sort of care
required from patent applicants would be reasonable under the
circumstances. They would be required to indicate the origin of the
resources that they knew or that they had a reason to know; this is a
reasonable care standard. In many cases, mere evidence of
compliance with the national laws of the countries providing the
genetic resources would suffice, without imposing on the patent
applicants the burden of engaging in complicated and costly
investigative efforts. On the other hand, infringers would not be able
to get away with illegal practices because the burden of proving the
failure by the patent owner to meet the reasonable care standard
would fall upon them. If they provided no evidence, no defense
would exist against the patent owner. Nevertheless, as explained
before, that standard would not be impossible to meet particularly
where the countries of origin had enacted laws on access to genetic
resources. In these cases, assessing whether the patent owner met the
standard would be almost a matter of objective fact finding.
One should bear in mind, however, that the real economic
dimension of the Requirement is closely linked to the filing of patents
for inventions derived from the utilization of genetic resources—
inventions in the fields of chemistry and biotechnology which find
their main markets in developed countries. Therefore, to enact laws
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imposing the Requirement in developing, biodiversity-rich countries
may not be economically significant if the same conditions do not
apply in developed countries. The ultimate goal of developing
biodiversity-rich countries, therefore, should be to establish the
Requirement as a condition of enforceability of patent rights at a
multilateral level, preferably in the framework of WIPO, which is the
most appropriate international forum for the discussion and
negotiation of new intellectual property concepts.78 As a second step,
and in order for biodiversity-rich countries to have access to the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism, the concept developed in WIPO
could then be incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement as a result of
multilateral trade-related negotiations.
78. See Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14,
1967, as amended on Sept. 28, 1979, articles 3 and 4. The application of the fraudulent
procurement doctrine in the context of access to genetic resources is a new concept indeed.
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